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Ashton, Bekins, and Necessity: Why Chapter 
9 Is Constitutional, But Not the Only Way 
for Municipalities to Adjust Their Debts 
Aaron Michael Dmiszewicki* 
The 1930s saw the nation in crisis, steeped in the worst of the 
Great Depression. In 1936, over 2,000 municipalities, counties, 
and other governmental units, in 41 of the 48 states, were known 
to be in default. In response to this crisis, Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Act in 1934 and passed the first municipal 
bankruptcy statute. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court struck 
it down. Undeterred, Congress passed another municipal 
bankruptcy statute in 1937, which was almost identical to the 
previously invalidated law. In 1938, the Supreme Court, now 
stocked with Roosevelt-appointed New Deal sympathizers, 
upheld the law. 
However, the latter case, while perhaps correctly decided, was 
woefully lacking in analysis. Since that time, no court has 
engaged in the appropriate legwork to make a case for both the 
need and constitutionality of a municipal bankruptcy statute. 
This paper aims to connect the dots between Chapter 9, the 
Contract Clause, and the Tenth Amendment to establish that, 
while Chapter 9 is undoubtedly constitutional, the Supreme 
Court overstated its necessity, and its necessity remains 
overstated today. 
 
                                                                                                             
 *  Associate, Fowler White Burnett, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL; J.D. magna cum laude, 
University of Miami School of Law (2014); B.A., Political Science, Duke University 
(2011). Special thanks to Professor Andrew Dawson at the University of Miami School 
of Law for sparking my interest in bankruptcy and for his invaluable comments and 
guidance, and to my non-lawyer friends and family who nodded and smiled 
encouragingly as I droned on about municipal bankruptcy in the 1930s. 
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PART I. INTRODUCTION 
Although municipal bankruptcy has existed since the 1930s, never 
did it get so much attention as when the City of Detroit filed the largest 
municipal bankruptcy in history in the middle of 2013. The filing caused 
an uproar, as thousands of state pensioners fought to prevent the City 
from modifying their retirement benefits in the bankruptcy.1 Various 
creditors and citizens filed roughly twelve objections, each with various 
sub-objections, to the Detroit filing, of which one was to the very 
constitutionality of Chapter 9.2 On December 5, 2013, Bankruptcy Judge 
Steven Rhodes issued a ruling on each of those objections, holding that 
Chapter 9 did not violate the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy 
Clause, the Contract Clause, or the Tenth Amendment.3 
This paper, however, focuses not on the Detroit bankruptcy in and of 
itself, but rather addresses the concern that states cannot adjust their 
debts outside of the bankruptcy regime, as well as the specific objection 
                                                                                                             
1 Matt Helms, Nancy Kaffer & Stephen Henderson, Detroit Files for Chapter 9 
Bankruptcy Amid Staggering Debts, Detroit Free Press, July 19, 2013, at A1; see also 
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and 
retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual 
obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.”). 
2 See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (analyzing and 
ruling on each of the objections). 
3 Id. at 136–54. 
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that Chapter 9 violates the Tenth Amendment. Indeed, at this point, a 
discussion of the objections themselves is largely moot, as the Detroit 
bankruptcy was confirmed in late 2014.4 In his opinion overruling the 
objections, Judge Rhodes hung his hat5 on a Supreme Court case from 
1938, in which the Supreme Court, recognizing the necessity of a 
municipal bankruptcy option during the height of the Great Depression, 
found that municipal bankruptcy was constitutional, only two years after 
striking down a similar law.6 Bekins adopted the logic, common in the 
bankruptcy context, that bankruptcy—and only bankruptcy—can fix 
these problems, so “get out of the way” and “let us do our job.”7 Bekins 
further suggested that, because the State of California consented to the 
bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment had been effectively waived, and 
there was no federalism issue.8 
Bekins, however, focused on the wrong issue. Even prior to the 
decision in Bekins, the Contract Clause—the traditional impediment to 
state insolvency solutions—had been under fire to the point where a state 
remedy really was a possibility.9 Today, however, the Contract Clause 
has been all but written out of the Constitution.10 Accordingly, were 
municipal bankruptcy to go before the Supreme Court for the first time 
today, the Court would likely have to rest its decision on something other 
than the states’ inability to act otherwise. This is largely because the 
modern trend in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is to focus on whether 
or not the federal government is coercing states to adopt a federal 
scheme. Plainly, by both the language of Chapter 9 and the presence of 
                                                                                                             
4 See Oral Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit, No. 13–53846 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/news/oral-opinion-
record-re-city-detroit-bankruptcy-judge-steven-rhodes-november-7-2014. 
5 In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 141–44. 
6 Compare United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (finding the new municipal 
bankruptcy law, as enacted in 1937, constitutional), with Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water 
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (finding the old municipal bankruptcy 
law, as enacted in 1934, unconstitutional). 
7 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54 (“We see no ground for the conclusion that the Federal 
Constitution, in the interest of state sovereignty, has reduced both sovereigns to 
helplessness in such a case.”); see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: 
Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 660 
(2008) (“We need to get bankruptcy work done somewhere, and the system we have—for 
all its conceptual anomalies—is as good as any.”). 
8 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 47–48; contra Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531 (“Neither consent nor 
submission by the states can enlarge the powers of Congress; none can exist except those 
which are granted.”). 
9 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) [hereinafter 
Blaisdell IV]. 
10 See infra Part III. 
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real alternatives for the states, that is not the case in the context of 
municipal bankruptcy.11 
In Part II of this paper, I will attempt to set Ashton and Bekins in 
their historical context in order to explore how we got to the conclusion 
that state consent is sufficient to meet any Tenth Amendment challenges. 
In Part III, I will explore the purported necessity of a municipal 
bankruptcy statute by exploring the relationship between the Bankruptcy 
Clause and the Contracts Clause, and show that municipal bankruptcy 
was not a necessary remedy at the time either Ashton or Bekins were 
decided, and remains unneeded. In Part IV, I will address the Tenth 
Amendment concern that still exists in Chapter 9, notwithstanding the 
lack of necessity for such a law. Finally, in Part V, I will conclude. 
PART II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ASHTON AND BEKINS 
A. The First Municipal Bankruptcy Statute 
To truly consider the requirements and constitutionality of Chapter 9, 
we must go back to the last great economic downturn in American 
history, the Great Depression. Prior to 1934, there was no municipal 
bankruptcy statute,12 leaving thousands of municipal units floundering 
during the height of financial catastrophe as the tax base crumbled 
beneath them.13 Congress, under immense pressure to act,14 passed the 
first municipal bankruptcy statute in 1934, which I shall call the 1934 
Act.15 In relevant part, it provided: 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to 
limit or impair the power of any State to control, by 
legislation or otherwise, any political subdivision thereof 
in the exercise of its political or governmental powers, 
                                                                                                             
11 Georgia, for example, specifically disallows municipal units from filing for 
bankruptcy. How, then, could Chapter 9 be coercive? See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 
(2013). 
12 Michael W. McConnell & Randall C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 427 (1993). 
13 Ashton, 298 U.S. at 533–34 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (noting that 2,019 
municipalities, counties, and other governmental units, in 41 of the 48 states, were known 
to be in default). 
14 See S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 1–2 (1934) (recognizing that only Congress could act, as 
the Contracts Clause bars the states from impairing the obligation of contracts). 
15 Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798 (codified as 11 U.S.C. 
§ 301–03) (1934) (amending the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to include “Provisions for the 
Emergency Temporary Aid of Insolvent Public Debtors and to Preserve the Assets 
Thereof and for Other Related Purposes”). 
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including expenditures therefor, and including the power 
to require the approval by any governmental agency of 
the State of the filing of any petition hereunder and of 
any plan of readjustment, and whenever there shall exist 
or shall hereafter be created under the law of any State 
any agency of such State authorized to exercise 
supervision or control over the fiscal affairs of all or any 
political subdivisions thereof, and whenever such agency 
has assumed such supervision or control over any 
political subdivision, then no petition of such political 
subdivision may be received hereunder unless 
accompanied by the written approval of such agency, 
and no plan of readjustment shall be put into temporary 
effect or finally confirmed without the written approval 
of such agency of such plans.16 (emphasis added) 
In short, Congress, cognizant of the potential Tenth Amendment 
pitfalls of a municipal bankruptcy statute,17 explicitly provided in the 
1934 Act that the states retained the power to determine whether a 
municipality was eligible to file for bankruptcy.18 
B. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1 
The 1934 Act received its first test on July 17, 1934, when a water 
district in Cameron County, Texas, unable to meet its bond obligations, 
presented a petition to the United States District Court.19 After the 
District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the Fifth Circuit 
reversed and remanded, the dissenting bondholders filed a petition for 
certiorari, which was subsequently granted.20 
Before discussing exactly what the Supreme Court did, it is 
important to note the makeup of the Court in 1936. The Hughes Court of 
the 1930s and early 1940s was something of a watershed moment in the 
history of the Court, as slowly but surely President Roosevelt replaced 
the four conservatives on the Court—Justices Butler, McReynolds, 
                                                                                                             
16 11 U.S.C. §  301(k) (1934), invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water 
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
17 S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 2. 
18 See Nicholas B. Malito, Municipal Bankruptcy: An Overview of Chapter 9 and a 
Critique of the “Specifically Authorized” and “Insolvent” Eligibility Requirements of 11 
U.S.C.A. § 109(c), 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 517, 520 (2008). 
19 In re Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 9 F. Supp. 103, 103 (S.D. 
Tex. 1934). 
20 Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 524 
(1936). 
64 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:59 
 
Sutherland, and van Devanter (collectively known as the “Four 
Horsemen”)—with pro-New Deal Justices Black and Reed.21 Bitterly 
opposed to almost all New Deal legislation, the Four Horsemen had 
fought tooth and nail to maintain a strict line between the powers of the 
states and the federal government and to limit the federal government’s 
power to regulate commerce.22 
In a 5–4 decision written by Justice McReynolds and joined by 
Justices Butler, Sutherland, van Devanter, and Roberts, the majority cited 
three reasons for finding the municipal bankruptcy statute 
unconstitutional.23 First, the Court held that because the water 
improvement district was a political subdivision of the state chartered for 
local benefit, its fiscal affairs were purely local and not subject to 
oversight by the federal government.24 If the obligations of the states 
were so subject to federal intrusion, then state sovereignty would not 
really exist.25 Secondly, the Court, invoking the Contract Clause,26 found 
that a state entity invoking the bankruptcy clause was an impermissible 
means of sidestepping the constitutional prohibition of states impairing 
contracts.27 Finally, the Court held that Congress did not possess the 
ability to increase its own power vis-à-vis the states, even with the states’ 
consent.28 Ashton has been criticized as “[motivated more by] judicial 
ideology than sound legal reasoning”29 and “unnecessary and 
misguided”30 by modern scholars; however, as I will soon point out, 
Bekins, the case that overruled Ashton, fails to engage in any meaningful 
constitutional analysis at all. 
C. The Second Municipal Bankruptcy Statute 
Undeterred by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ashton, and still 
recognizing a dire need for municipal bankruptcy, and reiterating the 
argument that “relief must come from Congress, if at all,”31 Congress 
                                                                                                             
21 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213–36 (1995) (describing the 
“Constitutional Revolution of 1937”). 
22 See id. at 132–33. 
23 Ashton, 298 U.S. at 527–28, 531. 
24 Id. at 527–28. 
25 Id. at 531 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430 (1819)). 
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”). 
27 See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531. 
28 Id. 
29 Malito, supra note 18, at 521. 
30 McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 452. 
31 H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 3 (1937). The Senate adopted the House Report verbatim 
in voting for passage. S. REP. NO. 75-911, at 1 (1937). 
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went back to the drawing board and enacted the second municipal 
bankruptcy statute in 1937 (which I shall call the 1937 Act).32 In relevant 
part, the 1937 Act provided: 
State powers unaffected. Nothing contained in this 
chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the power of 
any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any 
municipality or any political subdivision of or in such 
State in the exercise of its political or governmental 
powers, including expenditures therefor.33 
Despite considerably less sweeping language than the heretofore-
invalidated 1934 Act (note that the 1937 Act has no requirement that the 
state consents to a municipality’s petition), Congress strongly believed 
that the 1934 Act passed constitutional muster.34 However, Congress 
changed very little structurally in amending the statute; their argument 
essentially was that the Court in Ashton was wrong, not that the 
amendments addressed the Court’s concerns.35 
D. United States v. Bekins 
Unsurprisingly, given the ongoing solvency concerns in 
municipalities nationwide, the Supreme Court was soon given an 
opportunity to rule on the 1937 Act.36 In the two years since Ashton, 
however, the Court’s makeup had changed substantially. Justices 
Sutherland and van Devanter, two of the “Four Horsemen”, retired.37 
President Roosevelt replaced them with Hugo Black and Stanley Reed, 
both of whom were supporters of the New Deal and much more flexible 
in their understanding of dual sovereignty.38 Additionally, Justice 
Roberts, fresh off his “switch in time that saved nine” in West Coast 
                                                                                                             
32 Act of August 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653 (subsequently codified at 
11 U.S.C. §§ 401–04). 
33 11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (Supp. 1939). 
34 H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 2 (1937) (“The bill here recommended for passage 
expressly avoids any restriction on the powers of the States or their arms of government 
in the exercise of their sovereign rights and duties. No interference with the fiscal or 
governmental affairs of a political subdivision is permitted. The taxing agency itself is the 
only instrumentality which can seek the benefits of the proposed legislation. No 
involuntary proceedings are allowable, and no control or jurisdiction over that property 
and those revenues of the petitioning agency necessary for essential governmental 
services is conferred by the bill.”). 
35 Id. at 2–3. 
36 See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
37 See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 21, at 155–56, 220. 
38 See id. at 211–12, 226. 
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Hotel Co. v. Parrish,39 seemed to have become more amendable to the 
New Deal. In a 6–2 opinion,40 in another case involving an insolvent 
water district strangely enough, the Supreme Court upheld the 1937 
Act.41 However, in light of the holding in Ashton, the Court’s 
justification for changing its mind was startlingly weak, and it is just as 
likely that the Court’s change of heart was based on its composition than 
any legal argument.42 
The Court justified its decision based on three distinctions between 
the 1937 Act and the 1934 Act.43 First, the 1937 Act was limited to 
voluntary proceedings, as the 1937 Act makes it much more clear that 
only a taxing entity can be a petitioner.44 Secondly, the 1937 Act was, 
according to the Court, drawn so as not to infringe upon state 
sovereignty.45 Finally, the Court found no grounds for the conclusion 
that state sovereignty was so unshakeable that both the states and 
Congress would be reduced to helplessness in cases of municipal 
insolvency.46 
The Court’s second justification, that because California consented 
to the bankruptcy the Tenth Amendment concerns were assuaged, lacks 
any constitutional analysis. The Court began with the shocking 
declaration that, “It is unnecessary to consider the question whether 
Chapter 10 would be valid as applied to the irrigation district in the 
absence of the consent of the State which created it, for the State has 
given its consent.”47 This argument completely ignores the concern 
presented in Ashton, that “[n]either consent nor submission by the states 
                                                                                                             
39 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
40 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54 (Justice Cardozo, who authored the dissent in Ashton, 
strangely did not participate). 
41 Id. at 51. 
42 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶  900.LH[3] (16th ed., 2013); see also David Fellman, 
Ten Years of the Supreme Court: 1937–1947, I. Federalism, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1142, 
1148 n.28 (1947) (“Since the [1934 Act and the 1937 Act] were practically identical, a 
curious feature of the Bekins case was that instead of overruling the earlier decision, the 
Court made a feeble effort at distinguishing them.”). 
43 The bondholders also posited an argument that Chapter X, as it was then called, 
violated the Fifth Amendment. The Court dismissed this argument, citing In re Reiman, 
20 F. Cas. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (finding composition in bankruptcy constitutional). 
44 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 47; see also 11 U.S.C. §  402 (Supp. 1939) (defining a petitioner 
as “any taxing agency or instrumentality referred to in section 401 of this chapter”), and 
§ 403 (“Any petitioner may file a petition hereunder . . .”) (emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, even Ashton seemed to suggest that the 1934 Act only allowed for 
voluntary petitions. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 
513, 530 (1936) (“If voluntary proceedings may be permitted, so may involuntary ones, 
subject, of course, to any inhibition of the Eleventh Amendment.”). 
45 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51. 
46 Id. at 54. 
47 Id. at 47. 
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can enlarge the powers of Congress; none can exist except those which 
are granted.”48 What makes this even more perplexing is that, unlike the 
unconstitutional 1934 Act, the 1937 Act does not explicitly require state 
authorization.49 The Court “attach[ed] no importance to this omission,” 
without any meaningful explanation.50 This is not to say that the Court in 
Ashton was correct, but neither the Court in Bekins nor any subsequent 
court has done the appropriate constitutional legwork to explain how 
consent satisfies the Tenth Amendment in the bankruptcy context. 
Where the majority in Bekins really seems to ground its ruling, 
however, is in Congress’s assertion that a municipal bankruptcy statute 
was truly needed, and that absent congressional action, the states would 
be powerless to act.51 Unfortunately, mere exigency is not—and arguably 
should not be—enough to overcome the constitutional framework.52 
Only a year prior to Bekins, Justice Sutherland, in arguing that the states 
did not have the authority to enact minimum wage laws, wrote, “If the 
Constitution, intelligently and reasonably construed in the light of these 
principles, stands in the way of desirable legislation, the blame must rest 
upon that instrument, and not upon the court for enforcing it according to 
its terms.”53 Ultimately, whether or not the Constitution allows for 
exigencies such as this is a matter of ideology; however, even still, the 
Bekins majority failed to engage in the constitutional legwork. Instead, 
the Court was “of the opinion that the [House Committee on the 
Judiciary]’s points are well taken and that chapter 10 is a valid 
enactment.”54 Rather than challenging or engaging with the Committee’s 
argument—which, as I already discussed, was fairly weak—the Court 
simply accepts that the 1937 Act fixes all of the problems of the 1934 
Act.55 
PART III. THE NECESSITY OF A MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY STATUTE 
As Congress noted in passing both the 1934 Act and the 1937 Act, 
the general understanding of the Contract Clause at the time was that 
states were held essentially powerless in adjusting municipal debt, 
                                                                                                             
48 Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 
(1936). 
49 Compare 11 U.S.C. §  303(k) (1934), with 11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (Supp. 1939). 
50 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 49. 
51 Id. at 51. 
52 Though, as I shall explain in Part III infra the Contract Clause had already been 
subject to the same result, thereby obviating the need for municipal bankruptcy at all. 
53 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 404 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
54 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51. 
55 Id. at 51–53. 
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leaving only Congress able to act, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause.56 
Although that may have been true at the time—and it is not entirely clear 
that it was—it is almost certainly no longer true. Roughly three-quarters 
of a century of jurisprudence has largely eroded the original basis for 
passing municipal bankruptcy statutes and for deeming them 
constitutional by necessity. In short, Chapter 9 is constitutional today 
because the Court said so in Bekins. However, the reasoning behind it—
that Congressional action was necessary because the Contract Clause 
precluded the states from acting—was untrue then and is certainly untrue 
now. Were a court to see municipal bankruptcy today, without precedent, 
it is unlikely that it would declare it as violating the Tenth Amendment, 
as Chapter 9 lacks any meaningfully coercive elements. Rather, the 
“necessity” argument would focus not on federalism concerns but 
whether the exigency is sufficient to avoid the Contract Clause 
altogether. 
A. Was Municipal Bankruptcy Necessary in 1934? 
The Contract Clause, on its face, would seem to preclude states from 
passing any legislation that would impair the obligations of contracts.57 
Although there was very little discussion of the Contract Clause during 
the Constitutional Convention, there is some evidence that the Framers 
intended a broad reading of the clause, applying it to both private and 
public contracts.58 Prior to passing the 1934 Act, municipalities that were 
in danger of not being able to service their bond obligations could remain 
solvent essentially only by raising their taxes, a move that in the financial 
ruin of the 1930s would have been as politically unpopular as it would be 
ineffective.59 Although there was likewise very little discussion of the 
Bankruptcy Clause during the drafting of the constitution,60 the Framers 
                                                                                                             
56 See S. REP. NO. 73-407, at 1–2 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 75-517, at 3 (1937); see also 
U.S. CONST. art. I, §  8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . To establish . . .  
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States  . . . .”). 
57 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts.”). 
58 JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 45–46 (2007). 
59 See Jeff B. Fordham, Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligations of Public 
Corporations, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 28, 44–53 (1933) (discussing the existence of and 
requirements for a writ of mandamus to compel taxation); Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. 
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 533–34 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) 
(“In such circumstances the only remedy was a mandamus whereby the debtor was 
commanded to tax and tax again. The command was mere futility when tax values were 
exhausted.”) (citations omitted). 
60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 267 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet 
Classic 2003) (providing the sole mention of bankruptcy in the Federalist Papers). 
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probably would have understood it broadly to encompass both private 
and public bankruptcies.61 It was with that backdrop that Congress 
passed the 1934 Act. 
However, it is not readily apparent that, even by the time of the 
passage of the 1934 Act, the states were powerless to act. About four 
months prior, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Home Building 
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,62 in which the Court held that “[t]he economic 
interests of the state may justify the exercise of its continuing and 
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with 
contracts.”63 At issue in Blaisdell was the wonderfully alliterative 
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, which provided that, during the 
housing emergency brought on by the Great Depression, foreclosures and 
execution sales could be postponed via judicial proceedings.64 The 
economic situation in Minnesota was startlingly bleak, as farmers were 
forced to cope with the lowest agricultural prices in a generation.65 
Governor Floyd B. Olson, cognizant of other mortgage moratoria in the 
neighboring states of South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Nebraska, and under 
enormous public pressure, directed the state sheriffs to refrain from 
continuing any foreclosure action until further order, invoking the state’s 
traditional “police power” to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its 
citizens.66 The order was so popular that the Minnesota legislature 
codified it less than a month later.67 
The Home Building and Loan Association foreclosed on the 
Blaisdells’ home on May 2, 1932.68 Under Minnesota law at the time, the 
couple had one year to redeem the property, at a cost of about $3,700, 
exclusive of taxes and interest.69 Unable to redeem the property in time, 
                                                                                                             
61 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 370 (2006) (“The power granted to 
Congress by that Clause is a unitary concept rather than an amalgam of discrete 
segments.”). 
62 Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
63 Id. at 437. 
64 Id. at 416; see also MINN. STAT. §§  9633-1 to -21 (1934 Supp.). 
65 JOHN A. FLITER & DEREK S. HOFF, FIGHTING FORECLOSURE: THE BLAISDELL CASE, 
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE, AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 68 (2012). 
66 Id. at 70. 
67 Id. at 71. 
68 Id. at 89. 
69 Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 249 N.W. 334, 334–35 (Minn. 1933) 
[hereinafter Blaisdell II]. As an aside, such redemption laws are ancient, dating back at 
least to biblical times. See Leviticus 25:29–30 (JPS Tanakh) (“And if a man sell a 
dwelling-house in a walled city, then he may redeem it within a whole year after it is 
sold; for a full year shall he have the right of redemption. And if it be not redeemed 
within the space of a full year, then the house that is in the walled city shall be made sure 
in perpetuity to him that bought it, throughout his generations; it shall not go out in the 
jubilee.”). 
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the Blaisdells found themselves extremely lucky when Governor Olson 
signed the Mortgage Moratorium Law mere weeks before the sale was to 
be finalized.70 The Blaisdells filed suit under the Mortgage Moratorium 
Law seeking to extend their redemption period, but the trial judge 
immediately dismissed the case, reasoning that the law violated the 
Contract Clause and was an improper use of state police power because it 
served only private interests.71 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that the law 
did indeed impair the obligation of contracts.72 However, the majority 
disagreed with the trial judge, saying that, although normally it does not 
matter in whom the title to lands rest, the sheer number of families in 
danger of losing their homes was indeed a public concern, bringing it 
within the police power of the state to regulate.73 Additionally, the 
majority noted the narrow breadth of the law, which limited foreclosure 
by advertisement not by action, limited the time, and required a hearing 
before the redemption period could be extended.74 In other words, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court took a very narrow view of what it means to 
impair a contract and concluded that the moratorium did not meet that 
standard.75 After the Blaisdells won in the state trial court on remand, the 
Association appealed again and lost in the Minnesota Supreme Court, for 
the reasons they stated in the first appeal.76 
After having lost three times in the Minnesota courts, the Association 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which affirmed the 
Minnesota Supreme Court by a 5–4 vote.77 In a bizarre twist, after 
warning that “[e]mergency does not create power,”78 the Court 
sanctioned just the opposite and concluded that the Contract Clause was 
meant to “inspire a general prudence and industry,” not to prevent the 
                                                                                                             
70 FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 90. 
71 Id. at 91–92; see also Blaisdell II, 249 N.W. at 335. 
72 Blaisdell II, 249 N.W. at 335. 
73 Id. at 337; cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (holding 
approximately a decade later that an aggregate effect on the price of wheat allowed 
Congress to regulate purely intrastate wheat growth under the Commerce Clause). 
74 Blaisdell II, 249 N.W. at 338. 
75 Id. at 336, 338 (concluding that where the impairment is only temporary and 
narrowly tailored, the states’ general police power trumps the Contract Clause.). 
76 Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 249 N.W. 893, 894 (Minn. 1933) 
[hereinafter Blaisdell III] (per curiam) . 
77 Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934). 
78 Id. at 425. This mirrors language from the Minnesota Supreme Court, which read, 
“Although emergency cannot become the source of power, and although the Constitution 
cannot be suspended in any complication of peace or war, an emergency may afford a 
reason for putting forth a latent governmental power already enjoyed but not previously 
exercised.” Blaisdell II, 249 N.W. at 336. 
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state legislature from acting in a declared emergency.79 Although 
Blaisdell did not completely neuter the Contract Clause, it severely 
limited its force, as was demonstrated in subsequent cases.80 
Interestingly, as a matter of vote counting, the majority in Blaisdell 
was comprised of Justices Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo, and 
Roberts, with the Four Horsemen dissenting.81 Justice Sutherland, in 
blistering dissent, reasoned that “[The Contract Clause] was framed and 
adopted with the specific and studied purpose of preventing legislation 
designed to relieve debtors especially in time of financial distress.”82 
Justice Roberts, the obvious swing vote in Blaisdell, then perplexingly 
joined the majority in Ashton, which posited that municipal bankruptcy 
was simply a way to skirt the Contract Clause, by delegating the power 
to Congress, and otherwise adhered to the philosophy that emergency 
can enlarge neither enumerated powers nor explicit prohibitions.83 We 
may never know what caused this switch, as Roberts had his personal 
papers burned after his death.84 It does, however, continue to affect the 
credibility of the Court with respect to all of these decisions. 
What all of this serves to do is undermine the reasoning both of the 
dissent in Ashton and the majority in Bekins. The dissent in Ashton 
argued that, “[t]he Constitution prohibits the states from passing any law 
that will impair the obligation of existing contracts . . . .Relief must come 
from Congress if it is to come from any one.”85 The majority in Bekins 
opined that “[t]here is no hope for relief through statutes enacted by the 
States, because the Constitution forbids the passing of State laws 
impairing the obligations of existing contracts. Therefore, relief must 
come from Congress, if at all.”86 It is clear that neither of those 
statements were true. Like the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, 
the 1934 Act was time-limited.87 Like the Minnesota law, the 1934 Act 
                                                                                                             
79 Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. at 427–28 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison)). 
80 See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 157; see also infra Parts III.C–D. 
81 See Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. at 398, 448. 
82 Id. at 453-54 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); cf. Ashton v. Cameron 
Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) (“The Constitution was 
careful to provide that ‘no State shall pass any Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.’ This she may not do under the form of a bankruptcy act or otherwise.”) 
(citations omitted). 
83 See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530–31. 
84 FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 165–66 (positing Roosevelt’s court packing plan, 
Roosevelt’s landslide reelection in 1936, as well as a simple legal technicality). 
85 Ashton, 298 U.S. at 534. (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
86 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938). 
87 See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (1934) (“Until the expiration of two years from May 24, 
1934 . . . courts of bankruptcy shall exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings for the 
relief of debtors, as provided in this chapter of this title.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 9633-
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was tailored for a very specific emergency in the depths of the Great 
Depression.88 And yet Blaisdell was cited in neither Ashton nor Bekins, 
in neither majority nor dissent. In reality, there was at least some 
evidence that the states could act in a way that impaired contracts, as 
long as they did not impair them beyond what was necessary to counter 
the emergency.89 Although the 1934 Act may still have violated the 
Tenth Amendment, the alarmism of Justice Cardozo and the majority in 
Bekins was wholly unfounded. 
B. Had the Contract Clause Been Effectively Written Out of the 
Constitution by 1936? 
States have always been able to create their own bankruptcy statutes, 
with the caveat that such statutes can only govern contracts that do not 
yet exist and cannot be retroactively applied.90 But for the Contract 
Clause, municipal bankruptcy would be largely unnecessary, as states 
would clearly be free to adjust their municipalities’ debts on their own.91 
The Contract Clause took a big hit when the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the ruling of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Blaisdell 
IV, a ruling that should have been a strong factor in deciding Ashton and 
Bekins. Although Blaisdell was not even mentioned in either Ashton or 
Bekins, it is still widely believed that the Contract Clause precludes states 
from enacting their own bankruptcy statutes.92 In fact, the Contract 
Clause is all but dead, leaving modern legal justification for the necessity 
of municipal bankruptcy without a leg to stand on.93 
In the cases immediately following Blaisdell, the Court seemed 
determined to limit its applicability. In fact, less than six months after 
deciding Blaisdell, the Court struck down an Arkansas statute that 
                                                                                                             
20 (1934 Supp.) (“This Act shall remain in effect only during the continuance of the 
emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935.”). 
88 See 11 U.S.C. §  301 (1934) (“There is hereby found, determined, and declared to 
exist a national emergency caused by increasing financial difficulties of many local 
governmental unities, which renders imperative the further exercise of the bankruptcy 
powers of the Congress of the United States.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 9633-2 (1934 
Supp.) (“In view of the situation hereinbefore set forth, the Legislature of the State of 
Minnesota hereby declares that a public economic emergency does exist in the State of 
Minnesota.”). 
89 See Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. at 431 (“The obligations of a contract are impaired by a 
law which renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them.”) (citations omitted). 
90 See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197–200 (1819). 
91 See Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51. 
92 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 143–44 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) 
(finding that, save one case ostensibly limited to its facts, courts have always found that 
the Contract Clause prohibits municipal bankruptcy legislation). 
93 See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 174. 
2015] ASHTON, BEKINS, AND NECESSITY 73 
 
exempted life insurance proceeds from creditors’ garnishment.94 
Although the majority based its decision on the fact that, unlike 
Blaisdell, the Arkansas statute lacked the “temporary and conditional 
relief,”95 the concurrence, written by Justice Sutherland and signed by 
the other three Horsemen, used Thomas as an opportunity to fight back 
against Blaisdell, claiming  
[w]e are unable to agree with the view set forth in the 
opinion that the differences between the Arkansas statute 
and the Minnesota mortgage moratorium law . . . are 
substantial. . . . We were unable then, as we are now, to 
concur in the view that an emergency can ever justify . . . 
a nullification of the constitutional restriction upon state 
upon state power in respect of the impairment of 
contractual obligations.96 
In 1935, about a year after Thomas, the Court was confronted with a 
series of statutes, also from Arkansas, that tremendously warped the 
repayment options for defaulting debtors.97 Among other things, the laws 
increased the time for payment after notice of default from thirty days to 
ninety,98 reduced the late penalty from twenty percent to three percent,99 
and increased the amount of time a delinquent mortgagor could remain 
on the property from a minimum of sixty-five days to a minimum of six 
and a half years.100 Noting that none of the restrictions in the Minnesota 
law101 were present in this case, Justice Cardozo concluded for a 
unanimous court that “[t]here has been not even an attempt to assimilate 
what was done by this decree to the discretionary action of a chancellor 
in subjecting an equitable remedy to an equitable condition. Not 
Blaisdell’s Case, but [Thomas’s], supplies the applicable rule.”102 
Finally, in Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass’n,103 just under four 
months before deciding Ashton, the Court unanimously invalidated a 
Louisiana law that removed a building association’s obligation to 
                                                                                                             
94 See W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 434 (1934) (unanimous). 
95 Id. at 433–34. 
96 Id. at 434–35 (Sutherland, J., concurring). 
97 See, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co. ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs of St. Improvement Dist. No. 
513 v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935) (unanimous). 
98 Id. at 58–59. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 61. 
101 The Minnesota statute was limited to two years, only during the scope of the 
declared emergency, and creditors were still given the opportunity to be heard by a judge. 
Blaisdell IV, 290 U.S. 398, 416–18 (1934). 
102 Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. at 63. 
103 297 U.S. 189 (1936) (unanimous). 
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maintain a fund to pay shareholders. Treigle was not in the context of a 
moratorium; instead, the legislature simply revised the law governing 
building and loan associations and abrogated contracts between members 
and associations that were lawful at the time into which they were 
entered.104 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, reasoned,  
[the statute] does not purport to deal with any existing 
emergency and the provisions respecting the rights of 
withdrawing members are neither temporary nor 
conditiona . . . .Such an interference with the right of 
contract cannot be justified by saying that in the public 
interest the operations of building associations may be 
controlled and regulated, or that in the same interest their 
charters may be amended.105 
In light of these cases exploring the scope of Blaisdell prior to 
Ashton, a trend seems to have emerged. Blaisdell clearly did not initially 
signal “open season” on pre-existing contracts. Although the Court never 
spelled out a test for what crossed the line into unconstitutional 
impairment of contracts,106 it is apparent that by the time Ashton was 
decided, a state needed to show both economic emergency and that there 
were substantial safeguards in place to protect creditors’ rights.107 The 
argument, therefore, that states could not act themselves, was somewhat 
tenuous. In his dissent in Ashton, in which he argued that municipal 
bankruptcy was necessary because the states were forbidden from 
impairing contracts, Justice Cardozo completely ignored the Contract 
Clause jurisprudence of the previous three years.108 There were no 
Contract Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court between Ashton 
and Bekins, and, in Bekins, the Court did not bother to offer a citation at 
all to support its contention that the states’ hands were tied.109 Although 
there is certainly a difference between a moratorium and an actual 
discharge of debt, as long as a state had declared an emergency and 
provided creditors with an opportunity to be heard, there would seem to 
                                                                                                             
104 See id. at 195. 
105 Id. at 195–96. 
106 The Court would not actually establish a test until 1977, which I shall address infra. 
See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
107 See generally Samuel R. Olken, CHARLES EVAN HUGHES AND THE BLAISDELL 
DECISION: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF CONTRACT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE, 72 OR. L. REV. 
513 (1993). 
108 See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 534 
(1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (citing instead to Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 122 (1819) for the proposition that states cannot impair preexisting contracts). 
109 See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938). 
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be no reason why, under contemporary Contract Clause jurisprudence, 
the states would not be able to handle municipal debts sans federal 
involvement. 
C. State Composition Plans for Municipalities Post-Bekins 
In fact, states could—and did—implement their own municipal 
composition plans outside the federal bankruptcy scheme. In 1931, New 
Jersey adopted the Municipal Finance Act that authorized state control 
over insolvent municipalities.110 Like other such acts in the 1930s, New 
Jersey passed the statute “to meet the public emergency arising from a 
default in the payment of municipal obligations and the resulting 
impairment of public credit . . . in such a way as to cause the least 
embarrassment to property owners as taxpayers.”111 This adjustment of 
debt could be made binding on all creditors, whether or not they 
consented,112 though the law did nominally provide for the protection 
against the impairment of contracts.113 In the meantime, the erosion of 
the Contract Clause had continued after the Constitutional Revolution of 
1937, to the point where it was not clear it would still be enforced at 
all.114 
During the height of the Great Depression, years of “optimistic and 
extravagant” municipal expansion had brought the seashore resort town 
of Asbury Park, New Jersey to its knees.115 In short, the city had 
expanded and when the tax base crumbled and property values 
plummeted, the city was left holding municipal bonds it could no longer 
afford to service.116 Eventually, the creditors applied to the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey to have the Municipal Finance Commission put in 
charge of the city’s finances.117 Citing Bekins’ assurances that the federal 
                                                                                                             
110 See Act of Apr. 28, 1931, ch. 340, 1931 N.J. Laws 830 (supplemented by Act of 
June 27, 1933, ch. 331, 1933 N.J. Laws 866). 
111 §  405, 1931 N.J. Laws at 835. 
112 See Act of June 27, 1933, ch. 331, 1933 N.J. Laws 866, ¶  3. 
113 § 406, 1931 N.J. Laws at 835 (“[N]othing contained in this act shall be construed to 
impair in any way the obligations of any contract, or the existing remedies of any creditor 
of any municipality.”). 
114 See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 39 (1940) (“We are here 
considering a permanent piece of legislation. So far as the contract clause is concerned, is 
this significant? We think not . . . .If the legislature could enact the legislation as to 
withdrawals to protect the associations in that emergency, we see no reason why the new 
status should not continue.”); see also Gelfert v. Nat’l City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 235 
(1941) (“The fact that an emergency was not declared to exist when this statute was 
passed does not bring within the protective scope of the contract clause rights which were 
denied such protection in Honeyman v. Jacobs.”) (citation omitted). 
115 Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 503 (1942). 
116 Id. at 503–07. 
117 Id. at 503. 
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municipal bankruptcy statute was narrowly and painstakingly tailored so 
as not to impinge on the sovereignty of the states, the Court concluded 
that it was impossible that the power to enact a federal municipal 
bankruptcy statute, which specifically reserved state sovereignty, and 
which had not been recognized until 1938, had preempted the states’ 
rights to manage their finances outside of bankruptcy.118 The Court 
thereby rejected a sort of “dormant bankruptcy clause,” where only 
federal debt relief schemes would be permitted.119 Rather, the Court 
found that, “[t]he intervention of the state in the fiscal affairs of its cities 
is plainly an exercise of its essential reserve power to protect the vital 
interests of its people by sustaining the public credit and maintaining 
local government.”120 
As for the Contract Clause, the Court continued digging its grave. 
First, the Court seemed to suggest that, because the municipal bonds in 
question were practically worthless anyway, New Jersey was not actually 
impairing anything.121 In upholding the New Jersey statutes, Justice 
Frankfurter continued: 
From time to time, ever since Sturges v. Crowninshield, 
it has been stated that a state insolvency act is limited by 
the Contract Clause of the Constitution in authorizing 
composition of preexisting debts. So it is, but it all 
depends on what is affected by such a composition and 
what state power it brings into play. The dictum from 
Sturges v. Crowninshield is one of those inaccurate 
generalizations that has gained momentum from 
uncritical repetition.122 
Thus, because the bonds were practically worthless, and because 
mandamus was simply an “empty right to litigate,”123 the Court 
determined that, far from impairing the obligations of contracts, the 
Municipal Finance Act was actually beneficial to creditors, and that the 
                                                                                                             
118 See id. at 508–09. 
119 See Lipson, supra note 7, at 631 (arguing that the Bankruptcy Clause may have been 
meant more to deter a race to the bottom between states, and that the Framers may have 
actually intended state law bankruptcies to be the norm, judgments under which would be 
protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
120 Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 512. 
121 See id. at 513 (“[I]n view of the slump of the credit of the City of Asbury Park 
before the adoption of the plan now assailed, appellants’ bonds had little value; the new 
bonds issued under the plan, however, are not in default and there is a very substantial 
market for them.”). 
122 Id. (citations omitted). 
123 Id. at 510. 
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bondholders were foolish to insist upon standing on mere “paper 
rights.”124 In short, the Municipal Finance Act accomplished one of the 
primary goals of bankruptcy—protecting the rights of both the debtor 
and the creditors.125 
Faitoute was ostensibly limited to its facts.126 However, from a 
constitutional standpoint, it appears to still be good law.127 From a 
statutory standpoint, in 1946, Congress stepped in to limit Faitoute’s 
applicability when it amended section 403(i) of the Bankruptcy Act to 
provide that no state law composition mechanism could be binding on 
any creditor who did not consent.128 This remains, in slightly different 
language, the law today.129 In any case, it was suggested not long after 
Faitoute that the Contract Clause no longer served a purpose, as the 
analysis of whether or not the deprivation of a property right is 
“reasonable” essentially mirrors the analysis for any other property right 
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, and would likely turn out the 
same way under a Due Process challenge.130 
D. “Necessity” and the Contract Clause Today 
After Faitoute, Contract Clause jurisprudence remained virtually 
dormant for over twenty years.131 In 1965, the Supreme Court in City of 
El Paso v. Simmons reaffirmed the malleability of the Contract Clause 
with a Texas law regarding the sale of public lands.132 The modern 
approach for Contract Clause interpretation, however, was laid out in 
1977 in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey.133 In United States Trust, 
New York and New Jersey financed improvements to the Port Authority 
with public bonds on the condition that they not use the money to 
subsidize rail transit.134 New York and New Jersey, crunched by the 
                                                                                                             
124 Id. at 516. 
125 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 785–789 (1987). 
126 See Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 516. 
127 See McConnell & Picker, supra note 12, at 479–80. 
128 Act of July 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-481, 60 Stat. 409. 
129 See 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (“[A] state law prescribing a method of composition of 
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such 
composition . . . .”). 
130 See Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 HARV. L. 
REV. 852, 890–91 (1944). 
131 See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 169–70. 
132 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965) (“The decisions put it beyond question that the prohibition 
[against the impairment of contracts] is not an absolute one and is not to be read with 
literal exactness like a mathematical formula.”) (quotations omitted). 
133 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
134 Id. at 10–11. 
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energy crisis of the 1970s, then repealed the promise in their respective 
legislatures and subsidized rail transit anyway.135 
The Court, for the first time, applied an actual test to determine 
whether a Contract Clause violation had occurred.136 The test has four 
parts: 1) whether a contract with the state exists;137 2) whether that 
contract is substantially impaired;138 3) whether that impairment serves a 
significant and legitimate public purpose;139 and 4) whether that 
impairment was reasonable and necessary to satisfy that public 
purpose.140 The conservative Court of the 1970s141 actually struck down 
the legislation in question, on the grounds that concerns of environmental 
protection and energy conservation were known at the time the bonds 
were issued, and so the repeal failed under the fourth prong.142 The next 
year, a divided Court “dust[ed] off the Contract Clause”143 again in 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, where the Court once again 
struck down a state law under the Contract Clause, in which a Minnesota 
company that closed within the state would be fined to the extent that 
workers who had been employed for at least ten years did not receive a 
full pension.144 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the majority, reminded 
the world that “[t]he Contract Clause remains part of the Constitution. It 
is not a dead letter.”145 In a scathing dissent, Justice Brennan once again 
argued that the majority was rewriting a half-century worth of Contract 
Clause jurisprudence.146 He argued that imposing additional obligations 
on parties—as the Minnesota statute did—was not the same thing as 
                                                                                                             
135 Id. at 13–14. 
136 See generally Debra Brubaker Burns, Note, Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Pay: 
States, Their Public-Pension Bills, and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 253, 
261–69 (2011) (discussing in more depth the ins and outs of United States Trust and the 
test applied therein). 
137 U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17–18 (“The trial court found, and appellees do not deny, 
that the 1962 covenant constituted a contract between the two States and the holders of 
the Consolidated Bonds issued between 1962 and the 1972 prospective repeal.”). 
138 Id. at 21 (“[A] finding that there has been a technical impairment is merely a 
preliminary step in resolving the more difficult question whether that impairment is 
permitted under the Constitution.”). 
139 Id. at 22 (“[L]aws intended to regulate existing relationships must serve a legitimate 
public purpose.”). 
140 Id. at 25 (“[A]n impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to 
serve an important public purpose.”). 
141 See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 170–71. 
142 See U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 32. 
143 Id. at 44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
144 438 U.S. 234, 238, 251 (1978) (5–3 decision). 
145 Id. at 241. 
146 See id. at 251 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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diminishing or nullifying obligations, and that such an imposition could 
only be challenged as a taking under the Due Process clause.147 
Despite the momentary blip in the 1970s, however, the Court has 
since consistently upheld legislation against Contract Clause challenges, 
exhibiting a high level of deference to the legislature’s reasonableness 
determination.148 The Supreme Court has not taken a Contract Clause 
case since 1987.149 As far as anyone can tell, then, Blaisdell is still good 
law, and the Contract Clause is, even today, virtually read out of the 
Constitution.150 Accordingly, were the first federal municipal bankruptcy 
statute to be enacted today, neither Congress nor the Court could credibly 
argue that municipal bankruptcy was in any way necessary due to the 
strictures of the Contract Clause. Useful, perhaps, due to the expertise of 
the bankruptcy courts in handling complex restructuring matters, but not 
“necessary.” This is especially true as the United States continues to 
recover from an economic downturn that has been consistently compared 
to the Great Depression.151 For more than eighty years, even a narrow 
reading of the case law permits states to impair contracts in an 
emergency, so long as they take mitigating steps to protect the rights of 
the creditors whose contracts are being impaired. A broader rule, as in 
the more recent cases, gives the states even more power. 
PART IV. THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
In Bekins, the Court devoted very little time to the actual Tenth 
Amendment concerns, preferring to focus on the policy reasons for 
needing a federal municipal bankruptcy law.152 Those policy reasons, as I 
have just addressed, were largely unfounded.153 However, even though 
the policy reasons were unfounded, it does not change the fact there is 
still a municipal bankruptcy statute in effect today, and the statute is still 
                                                                                                             
147 See id.; cf. Hale, supra note 130, at 890–91. 
148 See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983) 
(unanimous) (holding that an energy pricing scheme that conflicted with existing 
contracts did not substantially impair the arrangement); see also Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (upholding a law pursuant to state 
police power that required mining companies to leave a certain amount of coal in the 
ground for structural support that was more than the amount the companies had 
contracted for with the landowners). 
149 See FLITER & HOFF, supra note 65, at 174. 
150 See id. 
151 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Great Recession Versus the Great Depression, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2009, 4:35 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/the-
great-recession-versus-the-great-depression/. 
152 See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 47–54 (1938). 
153 See supra Part III. 
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subject to Tenth Amendment challenges.154 In this section, I will dismiss 
the notion that Chapter 9 is unconstitutional, as least as of today.155 
The modern scope of the Tenth Amendment has been largely set 
forth156 in two Supreme Court cases, New York v. United States157 and 
Printz v. United States.158 Both of them suggest a definition of coercion 
that is fundamentally incompatible with the nature of a voluntary Chapter 
9 filing.159 In short, Congress may not “commandeer the legislative 
processes of the states” to force them to enact a federal program,160 but 
as I shall discuss, Chapter 9 falls outside of that coercive framework. 
The key provision in question in New York was the “Take Title” 
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
of 1985.161 States that were unable to properly dispose of their low-level 
nuclear waste under the federal regulatory scheme would be required to 
take title to the waste and incur liability for any damages that occurred as 
a result.162 Finding that the Take Title provision did not involve Congress 
threatening its use or disuse of its enumerated spending or commerce 
powers, but rather submitted the states to another federal instruction if 
the states did not comply, the Court struck down that provision of the 
Act.163 Honing in on the coercive nature of the provision, Justice 
O’Connor wrote, “A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive 
regulatory techniques is no choice at all.”164 
                                                                                                             
154 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 141–49 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
155 The Tenth Amendment was extremely underdeveloped in the case law at the time 
Bekins was decided. Indeed, Ashton largely rested on its violation. See United States v. 
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“The amendment states but a truism that 
all is retained which has not been surrendered.”); see also Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. 
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 530–32 (1936) (finding that the 1934 Act 
violated the Tenth Amendment). 
156 See Burns, supra note 136, at 281. 
157 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
158 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
159 This paper only deals with voluntary petitions, for two reasons. First, under the 
Bankruptcy Code, involuntary petitions against state entities are not permitted. Second, 
even if they were, such a filing would unquestionably violate the Eleventh Amendment, 
and very likely the Tenth as well. 
160 New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288); see also In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 149 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. 2013) (describing the holding of New York succinctly as, “[A] state cannot 
consent to be compelled.”). 
161 See New York, 505 U.S. at 151–53. 
162 See id. at 153–54. 
163 See id. at 176. 
164 Id.; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) 
(holding that Congress could not penalize states that chose not to comply with new 
Medicaid requirements under the Affordable Care Act by taking away their existing 
Medicaid funding). 
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Several years later, as a result of Congress passing the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, state chief law enforcement officers 
(CLEOs) were required to enforce certain background check provisions 
of the federal regulatory scheme.165 Even though the enforcement 
provisions were only temporary, private firearms dealers were still 
required to forward background check forms to the CLEOs, who then 
needed to process them.166 Once again, the Court struck down the Act as 
being coercive: “The Federal Government may neither issue directives 
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program.”167 In concurrence, Justice 
O’Connor, the author of New York, noted that Congress was free to 
amend the statute such that the states contracted with the federal 
government to enforce the regulation, à la federal highway funds in 
return for a drinking age of twenty-one.168 
The most recent case in which a federal law was struck down for 
being coercive was the first “Obamacare” decision.169 In Sebelius, the 
Court held that Congress was not permitted to withhold all Medicaid 
funding to a state that refused to participate in the new Medicaid scheme 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), noting 
that “Congress may not simply conscript states agencies into the national 
bureaucratic army.”170 Once again, however, the Court explicitly refused 
to “fix the outermost line” between congressional persuasion and 
coercion.171 
During oral argument of another case involving the ACA, King v. 
Burwell, the Court suggested that it might be revisiting the issue of 
coercion again.172 Specifically, the question was whether the way the 
petitioners were interpreting the ACA—that only healthcare exchanges 
established by states, as opposed to those established by the federal 
government, entitled their users to tax subsidies—demonstrated an 
                                                                                                             
165 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 903–04 (1997). 
166 See id. at 904–05. 
167 Id. at 935. 
168 See id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
169 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607. For a brief discussion of the term “Obamacare,” see 
Charlton C. Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: Medicaid 
Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 91, 94 n.3 
(2012). 
170 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2606–07 (internal quotations omitted). 
171 Id. at 2606 (“It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is 
surely beyond it.”). 
172 See Tom Miller, Unfair Coercion, or Greater Deference? Two New Sides of King v. 
Burwell, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 297, 299 (2015). 
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unconstitutional invasion of state sovereignty by Congress.173 In short, 
threatening the states with the options of setting up their own healthcare 
exchanges or suffering insurance “death spirals” may have been an 
unconstitutionally coercive choice. However, the issue of coercion went 
unmentioned in both the majority and minority opinions.174 The Court 
likewise denied an opportunity to review a decision out of the Third 
Circuit that held that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
of 1992 (“PASPA”) did not violate the anti-commandeering principal 
underlying the Tenth Amendment.175 Thus, it seems that, for the time 
being, our understanding of coercion is still constrained by New York, 
Printz, and Sebelius. 
Irrespective of where the Supreme Court winds up on the issue of 
coercion, what should be immediately apparent between the provisions in 
New York, Printz, Sebelius, and Chapter 9 is that Chapter 9 is both 
implicitly and explicitly non-coercive. To begin with, only voluntary 
petitions are permitted, and no creditor or group of creditors can submit a 
state or its subdivisions to the power of a federal court.176 Filing a 
voluntary petition is by definition a voluntary act. This is even more so 
the case where states have options outside the bankruptcy context, due to 
the frailty of the Contract Clause.177 Rather than a regulatory scheme that 
the state is forced into,178 Chapter 9 is simply another avenue for state 
subdivisions to adjust their debts. Furthermore, as an additional 
protection against federal intrusion into state financial affairs, the 
Bankruptcy Code explicitly provides that “[t]his chapter does not limit or 
impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a 
municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or 
governmental powers of such municipality, including expenditures for 
                                                                                                             
173 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15:18–19, King v. Burwell, No. 14–114 (U.S. 
Mar. 4, 2015) (Sotomayor, J.) (“Tell me how that is not coercive in an unconstitutional 
way?”). The issue in King was the statutory interpretation of the phrase “established by 
the state,” with respect to the healthcare exchanges set up under the ACA, and whether 
tax subsidies thereunder are available to individuals who obtained healthcare from the 
federal exchange. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Now, the Third Leg of the 
Health-Care Stool, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 1, 2015, 12:04 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/argument-preview-now-the-third-leg-of-the-health-
care-stool/. 
174 See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
175 See NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014). 
176 See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012), which does not incorporate section 303, the 
provision governing involuntary bankruptcies. 
177 See supra Part III. 
178 Indeed, Georgia has opted out of Chapter 9 entirely, and there has been no 
suggestion that this is somehow inappropriate. See GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2013). 
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such exercise,”179 and that unless the debtor consents, the court may not 
interfere with political powers of the debtor, property or revenues of the 
debtor, or the debtor’s use of any income-producing property.180 And 
although there may be some concern about the sovereignty of a 
municipality post-petition and post-waiver, that is beyond the scope of 
this paper. On its face, Chapter 9 complies with the Tenth Amendment. 
Congress, having been granted the power to write a uniform law on 
the subject of bankruptcies, is clearly within its right to enact a municipal 
bankruptcy statute, as long as it does so within the confines of its 
otherwise enumerated powers.181 The strictures of Chapter 9 plainly 
contemplate a Tenth Amendment challenge and are sufficient to rebut the 
same. Note that, under this understanding, it would not appear to make a 
difference constitutionally whether Congress required general 
authorization or specific authorization from the state under section 109 in 
order to file.182 As long as the state consents in some way to the filing—
that is, it is not coerced by an ultra vires act of Congress—a Tenth 
Amendment challenge will fall flat. The ultimate conclusion in Bekins 
was therefore correct;183 the Court simply needlessly focused on the 
supposed necessity of a municipal bankruptcy act and failed to pay 
adequate attention to the “real” issue of state sovereignty. 
PART V. CONCLUSION 
Although Chapter 9 had a rocky beginning in the Courts, there 
remains a relative dearth of case law, owing to the few number of cases 
filed and even fewer of number of actual cities filing.184 The unfortunate 
result of this, at least for the time being, is that in large Chapter 9 cases in 
which billions of dollars are at stake, such as Detroit, the 
constitutionality of Chapter 9 will continue to be litigated. The irony is 
that, if states acted on their own, pursuant to contracted Contract Clause, 
the state would probably still have to litigate. Thus, in some ways, it does 
                                                                                                             
179 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
180 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). 
181 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
182 See generally Daniel J. Freyberg, Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express 
State Authorization to Be a Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal 
Insolvency and What Will States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001 (1997) 
(describing the history and implications of the change from general to specific 
authorization under section 109(c)(2)). 
183 Focusing on the idea and ignoring the slight changes in the language and 
requirements Chapter 9 between 1937 and today. 
184 See David D. Bird, Chapter 9 and 11 Case Processing: Same, Similar or Different?, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2014, at 50, 50 (noting that only 215 Chapter 9 cases have 
been filed since 1990, compared to over 28 million filings overall.). 
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not matter under which method a state proceeds—if the money is big 
enough, there are going to be objections from creditors. It is my hope, 
therefore, that this paper has adequately addressed both of these issues, 
making their resolution easier when they inevitably arise. 
States have wide discretion to “impair” contracts, as long as they 
provide safeguards for the creditors who are taking a haircut. Bekins, still 
controlling law in the municipal bankruptcy context, was therefore 
correctly decided, but for the wrong reason. Likewise, the protections 
built into Chapter 9 allow Chapter 9 to survive any Tenth Amendment 
challenges. The modern Tenth Amendment is concerned with coercion, 
and, with the state either consenting or remaining in complete control 
every step of the way, it is difficult to compare Chapter 9 to either 
provision struck down in New York or Printz, or the withdrawal of 
Medicaid funding in Sebelius. Chapter 9 is here, and it’s here to stay. 
